Teams in Japan's two professional baseball leagues began to add foreign players to their rosters in the early 1950s, with the average number of foreign players per team reaching 5.79 in 2004. One reason for their increased use of foreign players was that foreign hitters substantially outperformed Japanese hitters. We show that the pace of team integration with African-American, Latino, and Caucasian players varied substantially across teams, a pattern also observed in North American professional baseball leagues. Using team data for the 1958-2004 seasons, econometric analysis shows that good teams that experienced a poor season played foreign players more frequently in the next season's games.
forces, is an interesting story in its own right. An empirical study of racial integration in Japanese baseball also allows us to place studies of Northern American baseball in comparative perspective, as professional baseball leagues on both sides of the Pacific Ocean share a common institution: The Rules of Play of the Game of Baseball. It's three strikes and you are out wherever baseball is played. The MLB and NPB rules of play have been almost identical in every post-WWII season, with rule changes initiated by MLB quickly adopted by NPB. 5 The common institution of the "Game of Baseball" provides the ideal setting for comparative analysis, as it allows researchers to identify how differences in markets for players, competition among league teams, league rules, and cultures affected choices of NPB and MLB teams and players.
There are several substantial differences in the economic and social environments in Japan and the United States that could have affected both the timing of a team's initial integration of foreign players and the team's decisions to play them in games in subsequent seasons. First, Japan did not have the same history of racial animus against AfricanAmericans or Latinos as the United States. Second, African-American and Latino players on MLB teams were usually paid less than Caucasian players, whereas foreign players on NPB teams were paid more than Japanese players. Third, in Japan, NPB rules limited the number of foreign players per team, whereas MLB rules did not explicitly constrain the number of African-American or Latino players per team after Jackie Robinson's debut with the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947. Finally, NPB teams are typically owned by large Japanese 5 Consider, for example, the parallel resolution in Japan and North America of the early 1970s controversies regarding the designated hitter rule (which allows a designated player to bat for the pitcher): The American League adopted the rule, while the National League balked. Two years later, the same debate went on in the NPB, and the same split-decision was adopted: The Pacific League adopted the rule and the Central League politely declined.
corporations, while MLB teams are typically owned by wealthy individuals and families. 6 We discuss these differences and others more fully below.
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the data sets that we use in our empirical analysis. We follow with a short history of NPB team integration and briefly compare experiences of NPB and MLB teams. Our empirical analysis focuses on four main questions: (1) When did NPB teams initially integrate with players from North and South
America and what factors affected team decisions? (2) How did teams' use of foreign players and use of players from specific racial and ethnic groups change over time? (3) How well did foreign players perform compared to Japanese players, and how did their presence on NPB team rosters affect team performances? And (4), what factors are associated with changes in team decisions to play foreign players in games over time? 7 We conclude with a discussion comparing the different yet similar paths of integration taken by MLB and NPB teams.
II. Data for NPB Teams, Japanese Players, and Foreign Players
Economists have extensively analyzed player and team performance in North American MLB because of the close correspondence between a hitter's marginal team product and his measured hitting performance as well as the availability of comprehensive data on player and team characteristics and performances over 136 seasons. There has been much less scholarly attention paid to Japanese professional baseball, and this may be partly 6 A few exceptions: The Seattle Mariners are owned by the American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, Nintendo. Three other MLB teams-Toronto Blue Jays (Rogers Communications), Chicago Cubs (Tribune Corp.) and Atlanta Braves (Liberty Media)-are owned by corporations. 7 We identify foreign players as those players defined as foreign by NPB.
due to shorter time series for the two Japan professional baseball leagues (which are generally available only from 1958) and the lack of a comprehensive database with relevant data on player and team characteristics and performances. Our analysis of NPB team integration uses data on players and teams for the 1958-2004 baseball seasons collected from multiple sources (listed separately in the Appendix) that enable us to crosscheck and resolve data discrepancies, particularly with respect to player race, ethnicity, and national status. We follow the NPB's rule for designating a player as a foreigner: Was the player born outside of Japan? We then classify foreign players into four different ethnic and racial categories: African-American, Latino, Caucasian, and Others, with Others being a residual category consisting almost entirely of players with Asian ancestries who were not born in Japan. 8 We classify a player as Latino if they were born in the Caribbean, Central America, or South America. We classify a player who was born in the United
States or Canada as African-American on the basis of available biographical information on the player and, when necessary, by examining publicly available pictures of the player. 8 Classification of players into racial and ethnic categories is inherently problematic for numerous reasons: Race and ethnicity are both dubious scientific categories; players, journalists, and scholars are not always well informed about a player's ancestry when they make classifications; and criteria used by fans, owners, or teammates to make racial or ethnic classifications can vary with the identity of the person making the classification.
9 Our rules for classifying players into racial and ethnic groups differ across racial and ethnic groups: we classify players as Latino based on their place of birth and as African-American based on their ancestry and, in limited cases, on the authors' evaluations of a player's skin color. This classification has been used by most studies of racial and ethnic discrimination in MLB because it is capable of implementation. If, however, Japanese baseball fans and the player's teammates are categorizing players as African-American or Latinos using different criteria, for example by darkness of skin tone, then our categorization of players will be problematic for Latinos with darker skin tones who might be classified as African-American and for lighter skin tone AfricanAmericans who might be classified as a separate "more acceptable" group. See Goldsmith et al. (2006) for an econometric study of the effect of skin tone on wages of African workers in U.S. labor markets. econometric studies. Each of the six panels is complete and balanced, with twelve cross-6 section units. We provide additional discussion of other variables used in our econometric analysis in the sections discussing these models and estimation results.
III. Integration in the Nippon Professional Baseball Leagues
While the rosters of NPB teams were predominately filled by Japanese players from the beginning of professional baseball in Japan in 1936 through the 1940s, foreign players were an accepted part of Japanese professional baseball in the 1930s. 10 Fitts (2009, p. 80) reports Table 3 , column
[ Table 3 here]
1. In the Central League regression, the estimated coefficient on WinPercent it-1 , is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicating substantial persistence in team talent and performance across seasons (Table 3 Because unobserved time-invariant factors specific to each team could be biasing the pooled OLS estimates, we experiment with random effects and fixed effects panel estimators. As results using both panel specifications are broadly similar, we focus on results from the random effects regressions ( and it is estimated with more precision, becoming statistically significant at the five percent level. However, the estimated coefficient for PropForeign it is now negative and remains statistically insignificant at the ten percent level.
Now consider the same regression specification with Pennant it substituted for
WinPercent it as the measure of team performance:
We estimate regressions for both leagues using pooled logit. Results are reported in Table   3 The increase in the number of foreign players on NPB teams in 1951 and 1952 led both leagues to impose a rule during the 1952 season that restricted each team's game-day roster to include no more than three foreign players selected from its full player roster (Table 4 ). In 1955, the two leagues imposed another rule limiting the number of foreign players on a team's full roster, i.e., a combined roster of players assigned to either the major league team or affiliated minor league teams. 20 Initially limiting each team to three foreign players on its full roster, the NPB reduced the cap to two foreign players [Table 4 here] in 1966 and raised it to three in 1981. 21 In 1996, the NPB eliminated restrictions on the number of foreign players on a team's full roster.
There have also been substantial changes in the rules regulating the number of foreign players from a team's full roster who can be registered by the team for a particular game. For the 1952-1965 seasons, a team was allowed to register three foreign players for a game. The NPB reduced the registration cap to two players in 1966, and this ceiling survived until 1994 when the NPB increased it to three players. Since 1998, teams have been allowed to register four foreign players for a game. Changes in NPB rules over time-which are somewhat more detailed than described above-are summarized in Table   4 .
Was the cap on the number of foreign players on a team's full roster binding? Figure   3 presents data on the number of foreign players on the full team roster of the teams with the smallest and largest number of foreign players and the average number of foreign 
V. Econometric Analysis of MLB Integration and Extensions to NPB Integration
Our analysis of NPB's integration with foreign players builds on the literature analyzing MLB's integration with African-Americans and Latino players after 1946. We briefly review the economics literature on MLB integration and then identify some broad similarities and differences between the two integration episodes. Gwartney and Haworth (1974) found that teams in North American baseball that were the first to add African-American players performed better than other teams. They concluded that the superior team performance of first-adopters was primarily due to the superior performance of the first African-American players. Contrary to Gary Becker's assertion that market competition would tend to gradually erode discrimination, Gwartney and Haworth found little evidence that under-performing baseball teams that were slow to add their first African-American player subsequently integrated more fully. Hanssen's (1998) re-examination of these issues concluded that the slow pace of integration by many
American League teams could be attributed to persistent discriminatory preferences of fans in American League cities. By contrast, Lanning (2010) attributes the slow pace of integration to discriminatory preferences of teammates and team owners. Finally, Coyne, Isaacs, Schwartz, and Carilli (2007) argue that team integration is likely to depend not just on the competitive performance of individual teams but also on the competitive balance within the team's league. In other words, a team that is just a few wins behind the league's best team, is more likely to add minority players than a team with the win-loss record and player talent that is far behind the league's best team.
There are some obvious similarities and differences between the MLB and NPB integration episodes. Consider these similarities. Both MLB and NPB team owners took risks when they decided to integrate, as they were unsure how the new players would perform, how Caucasian fans would respond to African-American players, and how Japanese fans would respond to foreign players so soon after World War II. In both Japan and North America, it quickly became clear that the average foreign player (in Japan) or minority player (in North America) performed better than the average Caucasian player on an MLB team or the average Japanese player on an NPB team. And with superior performances from a new group of players, a team might plausibly expect to win more games if it integrated before other teams in its league (Gwartney and Haworth, 1974) . Now consider these differences. In MLB, teams integrated with African-American players who faced discrimination from both fans and teammates, while in NPB, teams integrated first primarily with Japanese-American players from Hawaii and California. In Japan, many players from North and South America found it difficult to adapt to a complex extremely different cultural environment, social isolation, language barriers, daunting training sessions, and the very different strategies employed in the Japanese game.
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Perhaps the most striking difference is that for MLB teams, African-American players could be hired through the 1970s at a discount to Caucasian players, whereas for NPB teams, foreign players were paid a premium compared to Japanese players.
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Despite these differences, the same questions posed for MLB integration are central for NPB integration: Which factors affected team decisions to add their first foreign player? Which factors affected team decisions to play more foreign players in games in the seasons following the initial period of integration? We address both questions below.
VI. Discrete-Time Hazard Analysis of First Foreign Players on NPB Team Rosters
Our econometric analysis of NPB teams' choices to add their first Caucasian, African-American or Latino player to their rosters uses a piecewise-constant proportional 24 See Whiting (1989), and Fitts (2005; 2009) for great histories and stories of professional baseball in Japan. 25 Possible sources of higher salaries paid to foreign include the absence of a NPB draft assigning rights to a foreign player to a specific team and the higher reservation wages of U.S. players, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s when Japan's economy was rebuilding.
hazard model commonly used to analyze grouped duration data (Wooldridge, 2010 (Wooldridge, , 1010 (Wooldridge, -1017 
We have used a parsimonious specification of covariates, just two variables, due to limited degrees of freedom. We include League i in the hazard regression specification because previous research on MLB and NPB has found distinct differences in the competitive environment within each of the two MLB leagues and NPB leagues. Coyne, Issacs, Schwartz, and Carilli (2007) we include a measure of the team's success in the previous season to determine the source of innovation in roster composition. As discussed above, adding the first foreign player from a particular ethnic/racial group to a baseball team composed almost entirely of Japanese players is a risky and expensive action that could trigger changes in attendance at team games, coordination of player actions on and off the field, and team performance.
Our three basic specifications for the logit regression are:
where First_Ethnic equals one in the season t in which team i hires its first player of a particular ethnicity and 0 in earlier seasons. We use variants of this variable for three ethnicities: First_Caucasion, First_African-American, and First_Latino. α t is a vector of baseball season dummy variables employed to estimate duration-dependent baseline hazard rates, and ε it is an iid error term.
Results from logit regressions for each ethnic group are reported in Table 5 . The
[ Foreign_ODPlays it provides a direct adjustment for the team's utilization of the player in games and an indirect adjustment for the player's quality because a team is only allowed to have 9 players from its 25-player game roster in action on any given play. 28 Use of our composite measure also enables us to bypass econometric problems associated with estimating regressions with a dependent variable that takes the form of count data.
Our econometric model is a variation on the basic model specified by Hanssen and Meehan (2009) to investigate how prior performance of an NPB team affects the team's willingness to add minority players to its roster: 28 A player who leaves a baseball game and is replaced by another player cannot return later to the game, as in soccer and unlike in basketball or American football.
The estimated coefficients on the one-and two-period lags of WinPercent it are the main focus of this regression, as they are the only team characteristics specified in our regression model. We note that WinPercent it is measured without error and is pre-determined (albeit not strictly exogenous) to the dependent variable due to being lagged one period.
Income it -real GDP per capita of the prefecture in which the team's stadium is located, are more time-periods than cross-section units, it becomes important to ensure that the data panels used in the regression are stationary in order to obtain consistent unbiased estimates of coefficients. are stationary series, we can apply standard panel inference methods to interpret the regression's estimated coefficients.
Results from the difference specification of the fixed effect panel regressions are (7) easier to interpret because the dependent variable, the two variables (WinPercent it-1 and WinPercent it-2 ) used to test our main hypothesis, and the control variable (∆INCOME it ) are all stationary. Standard errors are clustered by team, as annual errors are likely to be correlated due to, among other things, multi-season contracts with team players and coaches.
We also estimate a dynamic panel specification that uses Non-Jpn_ODPlays it as the dependent variable and includes a lagged dependent variable. While GMM estimators are often the preferred choice for this type of specification, the small number of cross-section units (12 teams) and the longer number of time periods (45 seasons) indicates that the biascorrected least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is likely to perform better than GMM estimators with respect to bias and root mean squared error criteria (Bruno, 2005) .
We use a parametric bootstrap procedure to calculate standard errors. Table 7 reports results for fixed effects panel regressions on ∆Non-Japanese_ODPlays it using the equation 7 specification, and for dynamic panel regressions on Non-Japanese_ODPlays it using the equation 6 specification; both specifications are run using the two alternate measures of team performance, WinPercent it and GamesBack it . 34 In all four specifications (Table 7 , columns 1-4), estimated coefficients on ∆Income it are small 34 In Tables 7 and 8 , we multiply all estimated regression coefficients and standard errors by 100 to facilitate reporting and discussion of results. The main focus of our ODPlays regressions is to test the hypothesis that a team's decision to use foreign players more frequently in its games is related to team performance over the previous two seasons. An important finding is that the signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for both measures of team performance are broadly consistent. In all four specifications, the estimated coefficient on the lagged team performance variable has a consistent sign (i.e., negative for WinPercent it-1 and positive for GamesBack it-1 ) and is statistically significant at the five percent level.
Following this pattern, the estimated coefficient on the two-period lag of the team performance variable again has a consistent sign (i.e., positive for WinPercent it-2 and negative for GamesBack it-2 ) in all four specifications and is statistically significant at the ten percent level in three of the four specifications.
These results are somewhat different from those in either Goff et al. (2002) or Hanssen and Meehan (2009) Table 7 , columns 1 and 3). Table 8 reports results for six specifications using the same two alternate measures of team performance for each of the three ethnic groups. The estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is less than 100 in all specifications and is statistically significant at the five percent level. Estimated coefficients for the team performance measures are similar to those reported in Table 7 for all non-Japanese players. In all four specifications, the estimated coefficient on the lagged team performance variable has a consistent sign (again, negative for WinPercent it and positive for GamesBack it-1 ) but only one coefficient (WinPercent it-1 in the Caucasian regression) is statistically significant at the five or ten percent level. Signs for the estimated coefficient on the two-period lag of the team performance variable again follow those in Table 7 for the Latino and Caucasian account for some of the differences in results.
regressions, but are reversed for the African-American regressions. Only one coefficient,
GamesBack it-2 in the Caucasian regression, is statistically significant at the five or ten percent level. While the overall pattern of the estimated coefficients in the ODPlays regressions for the three ethnic/racial groups resembles that observed in the NonJapanese_ODPlays regressions, coefficients are estimated with less precision. 36 We conclude that our econometric results for all foreign players do not readily extend to the smaller samples of Latinos, Caucasian, and African-American players. Interpretation of these results is not obvious: the statistically insignificant result could be due to the reduced precision of estimates using the smaller sample sizes of the respective player groups or, alternatively, could indicate that the relationship does not exist for the particular racial/ethnic group of players.
VIII. Understanding Differences in Behavior Across MLB and JPL Teams
NPB's integration with foreign players and MLB's integration with racial and ethnic minorities both took place during the two decades after World War II, and we found many similarities between the two processes. First, initial integration of teams took a surprisingly long time to complete in both Japan and the United States, with the Boston Red Sox only adding an African-American player in 1959 and the Tokyo Giants only adding a Latino player in 1986. Second, during the initial decades of integration, NPB foreign players had higher slugging averages than NPB Japanese players, and MLB minority players had higher slugging averages than Caucasian players. Third, MLB 36 We note that the sign of the estimated coefficient on ForeignCap=3 t is negative in the AfricanAmerican regressions and positive in the Caucasian regressions, thereby indicating some tendency for teams to replace African-American players with Caucasian players as the team cap on foreign players registered per game increased from two to three.
National League teams that added minority players and NPB Central League teams that added foreign players were more likely to win pennants than other teams.
There were also notable differences in how MLB and NPB team characteristics affected their play of foreign players in games after the initial period of integration. Goff et al. (2004) found that better-performing MLB teams were more likely to add minority players to their rosters; Hanssen and Meahan (2007) found weak support for the opposite proposition; and Coyne et al. (2007 Coyne et al. ( , 2010a Coyne et al. ( , 2010b found that winning teams within striking distance of a pennant were more likely to add minority players. For NPB teams, we identified a more nuanced relationship between team performance and the team's play of foreign players: Good teams gone bad were more likely to play foreign players, while
Bad teams gone good were less likely.
One factor that might explain this pattern in Japan's professional baseball leagues is that teams are typically owned by large profit-maximizing Japanese corporations.
Corporate owners of a team with a history of good performance that experiences a bad season may be worried that more embarrassing performances would tarnish their corporation's image. A quick, but expensive, solution (due to the higher salaries paid to foreign players) is for the team to enter the market for foreign players who, unless they are already under contract to another NPB team, are not "reserved" for particular teams.
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Vice-versa, an NPB team with a history of less than stellar performance that experiences a rare good season may drop expensive foreign players when the team's performance surge comes primarily from the less expensive Japanese players on its roster. Other factors may also be operating, such as the relatively short median tenure of foreign players (varying 37 In a rare expansion of MLB's reserve clause beyond U.S. and Canadian borders, the Minnesota Twins sold their player contract with Greg "Boomer" Wells to the Hankyu Braves in 1983 (Fitts 2005, 152-153 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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